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I. INTRODUCTION
IN THIS AGE of increasing commercial aviation activity, mak-ing the world smaller for every person who has a few hundred
dollars (or another country’s equivalent) to purchase a plane
ticket, the revelation that Andreas Lubitz most likely intention-
ally crashed the Airbus 320 Germanwings flight 4U 9525 carry-
* Jennifer M. Clark is an associate in the Tampa office of Murray, Morin &
Herman, P.A. She represents clients in the aviation industry, including
manufacturers, pilots, airports, fixed base operators, repair stations, and charter
operators, as well as various non-aviation clients. Ms. Clark was assisted in
preparation of this article by YueLing E. Lee, a former associate in the firm’s
Tampa office, as well as Nathan M. Wheat, a partner in the firm’s Tampa office.
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ing 150 passengers into the French Alps1 was shocking and,
frankly, terrifying. On March 24, 2015, the flight from Du¨ssel-
dorf, Germany, to Barcelona, Spain, likely began the same as
any other European regional flight. The passengers arrived at
the airport for their flight, some earlier than necessary, others
maybe running late. They waited in line to have their persons
and baggage checked for any potential security threats. Some
bags were likely double-checked because a passenger may have
forgotten to remove a bottle of water or other liquid from the
bag before placing it on the belt for the x-ray machine. These
passengers had no idea that one of the pilots, in whom they
would be placing their trust to provide them safe transport, was
seriously emotionally and mentally disturbed to the point that
he intended to commit mass murder and suicide on that flight.2
To alleviate our personal safety concerns and make us feel good
about continuing to travel on commercial airlines, we all would
like to think that there is something that should or could have
been done to prevent this tragedy. We look to the regulations in
place, trying to find any possible amendment that could prevent
this from happening again in the future. Governmental
taskforces and safety committees make recommendations, and
we all feel better that we have done everything we can to prevent
another such tragedy. The question remains, though, after all
that effort, have we actually accomplished anything that will
make any of us safer from the plans of someone like Andreas
Lubitz?
According to the investigation by Bureau d’Enqueˆtes et
d’Analyses (BEA Preliminary Report),3 the co-pilot on flight 4U




3 BUREAU D’ENQUEˆTES ET D’ANALYSES, PRELIMINARY REPORT: ACCIDENT ON 24
MARCH 2015, at 2 (2015) [hereinafter BEA PRELIMINARY REPORT]. The Final Re-
port was published in March 2016, after preparation of this article but before
publication. The Bureau d’Enqueˆtes et d’Analyses (BEA) is the French agency
for investigating aviation safety, similar to the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) in the United States, which views its role as “determin[ing] the
probable cause of accidents and develop[ing] recommendations that will prevent
future accidents or reduce their effects in terms of injury, loss of life, or damage
to property.” NTSB, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD FISCAL YEAR 2015
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 5 (2015). The NTSB further boasts
14,300 safety recommendations following at least 143,000 aviation accident rec-
ommendations and thousands of non-aviation accident investigations since 1967.
Id. The NTSB’s budget for fiscal year 2015 was $104 million, and the requested
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9525, Lubitz, was left alone in the cockpit while the pilot went
back to the main cabin.4 During that time, Lubitz changed the
selected altitude from 38,000 feet to 100 feet, which led to a
steady descent.5 Also during that time, Lubitz increased and de-
creased the airspeed multiple times.6 Multiple air traffic control-
lers attempted to contact the plane to figure out the reason for
the erratic inputs, but received no response.7 Then the pilot re-
turned, requested entry to the cockpit multiple times and, re-
ceiving no response, possibly attempted to break down the
impenetrable door.8 The plane crashed into the side of a moun-
tain, killing everyone on board—144 passengers and six crew
members.9
When the cockpit voice recorder was located and reviewed by
investigators, they determined this was most likely an intentional
act.10 As further support for this theory, investigators revealed
that Lubitz had practiced for this on an earlier flight the same
day.11 While the pilot was out of the cockpit, Lubitz had made
similar odd maneuvers, including decreasing the altitude setting
on the autopilot system to 100 feet and increasing and decreas-
ing the airspeed.12 As the investigation continued, more facts
about Lubitz’s medical history came to light. He had been
treated for depression for several years.13 He was denied a medi-
cal certificate twice during training as a result of his mental
health examination.14 Subsequently, when he obtained a medi-
cal certificate, it contained a special condition requiring specific
regular medical examinations and for the Aviation Medical Ex-
aminer (AME) to contact the licensing authority before issuing
a renewal.15
Following the crash, a significant amount of information re-
garding Lubitz’s medical and psychological history has come to
budget for fiscal year 2016 is $105.2 million to support 423 full-time equivalent
employees. Id.
4 BEA PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 7–9.
8 Id. at 8–9.
9 Id. at 9.
10 Id. at 29.
11 Id. at 22–23.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 13.
14 Id. at 12–13.
15 Id.
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light. It seems he started to experience vision problems in De-
cember 2014.16 He saw an ophthalmologist, who found nothing
wrong, then followed up with many other eye specialists who
also found nothing wrong with his eyesight.17 A psychiatrist he
saw in January 2015 diagnosed him with depression, prescribed
a strong antidepressant, and encouraged him to write in a “hap-
piness diary.”18 In the diary, Lubitz discussed that he was exper-
iencing insomnia.19 Lubitz was subsequently diagnosed with
hypochondriacal disorder, and records from February 2015 in-
dicated he denied suicidal thoughts.20 By March, his doctor ap-
parently became increasingly concerned about his mental
health and gave him a note excusing him from work from
March 12–30, 2015.21 It seems the note was never given to his
employer.22 Further, it appears that none of the doctors advised
the airline of their concerns regarding Lubitz’s condition but
relied on Lubitz to self-report.23 Based on the reports, it seems
that he was afraid he was losing his eyesight and that he would
no longer be able to fly.24
The BEA’s Preliminary Report further notes that, since 1980,
only six instances of crashes likely caused by intentional actions
of the flight crew have been found in the International Civil Avi-
ation Organization (ICAO) and BEA databases.25 The most
16 Justin Huggler, Germanwings Pilot Andreas Lubitz Kept Diary That Shows His








21 Id. It appears that Lubitz tore up the note rather than giving it to his em-
ployer. See Ben Knight et al., Germanwings Co-Pilot Andreas Lubitz ‘Wanted to Make
Everyone Remember Him’, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2015), https://www.theguardian
.com/world/2015/mar/27/germanwings-co-pilot-andreas-lubitzs-background-
under-scrutiny [https://perma.cc/8VWX-9E3A]. He also had told a former girl-
friend, a flight attendant, “One day I will do something that will change the
whole system, and then all will know my name and remember it.” Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 See Huggler, supra note 16.
25 BEA PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 26. The flights referenced are:
September 2, 1982, Japan Airlines, DC-8, with 24 fatalities; August 21, 1994, Royal
Air Moroc, ATR42, with 44 fatalities; December 19, 1997, Silk Air, B737, with 104
fatalities; October 11, 1999, Air Botswana, ATR42, with 1 fatality; October 31,
1999, EgyptAir, B767, with 217 fatalities; and November 29, 2013, Linhas Ae´reas
de Moc¸ambique (Mozambique Airlines), ERJ190, with 33 fatalities. Id.
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deadly of the crashes noted, the EgyptAir crash into the North
Atlantic Ocean in 1999 that killed 217 on board, was summa-
rized as follows:
The [air]plane was in cruise at flight level 330 with a flight crew
consisting of a Captain, a duty co-pilot[,] and a relief co-pilot.
The duty co-pilot left the cockpit, and the relief co-pilot took his
place in the right seat. Eight minutes later, the Captain left the
cockpit in turn, leaving the relief co-pilot alone. The autopilot
was then disengaged and nose-down inputs were recorded on the
FDR. The [air]plane descended. The engines were shut down.
The Captain returned to the cockpit and tried to take back con-
trol of the [air]plane. The Captain repeatedly asked the co-pilot
to help him to pitch up the [air]plane (“pull with me”)[,] but
the latter continued to command the elevator to pitch nose
down. The [air]plane regained altitude before descending again.
It collided with the surface of the ocean. The reasons that led the
co-pilot to take these actions could not be determined.26
There are two significant issues to note from this description of
the EgyptAir crash: first, the captain was not locked out of the
cockpit but was still unable to prevent the crash; second, even
more than fifteen years after the accident, it remains unclear
why the co-pilot decided to crash the aircraft into the ocean.27
II. AEROMEDICAL REGULATIONS
This section addresses and compares only aeromedical regula-
tions established by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). The purpose
of the comparison is to analyze the regulations in place in Eu-
rope at the time of the Germanwings crash, as well as those in
the United States, in an effort to note any potential holes in the
regulations that might allow another similar incident to occur.
To the contrary, additional analysis is provided from the per-
spective of pilots who feel they are already overly regulated and
monitored by the FAA and EASA as well as their employers (for
commercial pilots).
A. UNITED STATES
Pursuant to the Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 61, in
particular, there are three categories of medical certificates.28 A
26 Id. at 27.
27 Id.
28 Certification: Pilots, Flight Instructors, and Ground Instructors, 14 C.F.R.
§ 61.23(a) (2016).
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first-class medical certificate, which is required for airline pilots,
expires twelve months after the date of examination for pilots
under age forty or six months after the date of examination for
pilots over forty at the time of the most recent examination.29
When conducting operations not requiring an airline transport
pilot certificate, a medical certificate is valid for longer periods
of time, although each category requires increased frequency of
examination for pilots over age forty.30 Pilots operating light-
sport aircraft are not required to obtain an FAA medical certifi-
cate and, instead, can use a valid U.S. driver’s license as a medi-
cal certificate, unless the pilot “know[s] or ha[s] reason to know
of any medical condition that would make that person unable to
operate a light-sport aircraft in a safe manner.”31 This option is
not available if the most recent FAA medical exam has resulted
in a denial of a medical certificate.32
FARs regarding disqualifying mental conditions are fairly
comprehensive, particularly with regard to the requirements for
a First-Class Medical Certificate.33 According to the FARs:
Mental standards34 for a first-class airman medical certificate are:
(a) No established medical history or clinical diagnosis of any of
the following:
(1) A personality disorder that is severe enough to have re-
peatedly manifested itself by overt acts.
(2) A psychosis. As used in this section, “psychosis” refers to
a mental disorder in which:
(i) The individual has manifested delusions, hallucina-
tions, grossly bizarre or disorganized behavior, or
other commonly accepted symptoms of this condi-
tion; or
(ii) The individual may reasonably be expected to mani-
fest delusions, hallucinations, grossly bizarre or dis-
organized behavior, or other commonly accepted
symptoms of this condition.
29 Id. § 61.23(d).
30 See id.
31 Id. § 61.23(c)(2)(iv). This is often interpreted by pilots as a rather subjective
standard. A pilot who wishes to continue flying but anticipates not being able to
pass a medical exam may choose not to apply and simply limit operations to light-
sport aircraft. While such an interpretation of this FAR was likely not intended, it
is generally considered unlikely to result in any negative enforcement action
against a pilot operating under this interpretation.
32 Id. § 61.23(c)(2)(ii)–(iii).
33 See Medical Standards and Certification, 14 C.F.R. § 67 (2016).
34 The exact same standard is set forth for second-class and third-class airman
medical certificates in 14 C.F.R. § 67.207 and 14 C.F.R. § 67.307, respectively.
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(3) A bipolar disorder.
(4) Substance dependence, except where there is estab-
lished clinical evidence, satisfactory to the Federal Air
Surgeon, of recovery, including sustained total absti-
nence from the substance(s) for not less than the pre-
ceding 2 years. As used in this section—
(i) “Substance” includes: Alcohol; other sedatives and
hypnotics; anxiolytics; opioids; central nervous sys-
tem stimulants such as cocaine, amphetamines, and
similarly acting sympathomimetics; hallucinogens;
phencyclidine or similarly acting arylcyclohexy-
lamines; cannabis; inhalants; and other psychoac-
tive drugs and chemicals; and
(ii) “Substance dependence” means a condition in
which a person is dependent on a substance, other
than tobacco or ordinary xanthine-containing (e.g.,
caffeine) beverages, as evidenced by—
(A) Increased tolerance;
(B) Manifestation of withdrawal symptoms;
(C) Impaired control of use; or
(D) Continued use despite damage to physical
health or impairment of social, personal, or oc-
cupational functioning.
(b) No substance abuse within the preceding 2 years defined as:
(1) Use of a substance in a situation in which that use was
physically hazardous, if there has been at any other time
an instance of the use of a substance also in a situation
in which that use was physically hazardous;
(2) A verified positive drug test result, an alcohol test result
of 0.04 or greater alcohol concentration, or a refusal to
submit to a drug or alcohol test required by the U.S.
Department of Transportation or an agency of the U.S.
Department of Transportation; or
(3) Misuse of a substance that the Federal Air Surgeon,
based on case history and appropriate, qualified medical
judgment relating to the substance involved, finds—
(i) Makes the person unable to safely perform the du-
ties or exercise the privileges of the airman certifi-
cate applied for or held; or
(ii) May reasonably be expected, for the maximum du-
ration of the airman medical certificate applied for
or held, to make the person unable to perform
those duties or exercise those privileges.
(c) No other personality disorder, neurosis, or other mental
condition that the Federal Air Surgeon, based on the case
history and appropriate, qualified medical judgment relating
to the condition involved, finds—
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(1) Makes the person unable to safely perform the duties or
exercise the privileges of the airman certificate applied
for or held; or
(2) May reasonably be expected, for the maximum duration
of the airman medical certificate applied for or held, to
make the person unable to perform those duties or exer-
cise those privileges.35
With regard to each class, AME guidance indicates that pilots
should have “[n]o diagnosis of psychosis, or bipolar disorder, or
severe personality disorders.”36 Further, disqualifying conditions
related to mental health include: psychosis, bipolar disorder,
personality disorder “severe enough to have repeatedly mani-
fested itself by overt acts,” substance dependence, substance
abuse, disturbance of consciousness “without satisfactory expla-
nation of cause,” and “[t]ransient loss of control of nervous sys-
tem function(s) without satisfactory explanation of cause.”37
The Guide for Aviation Medical Examiners (the Guide) pro-
vides a procedure for permitting special issuance at the discre-
tion of the Federal Air Surgeon, and in certain cases, with the
assistance of the AME, for various disqualifying conditions.38 A
special issuance may be provided even with major depressive dis-
order, dysthymic disorder, adjustment disorder with depressed
mood, or a non-depression related condition for which a selec-
tive serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) is used.39 For these con-
ditions, the applicant is not acceptable for a special issuance if
there is any history or symptoms of psychosis, suicidal ideation,
electroconvulsive therapy, treatment with multiple SSRIs con-
currently, or multi-agent drug protocol use.40
According to the Guide, “[t]he FAA does not expect the
[AME] to perform a formal psychiatric examination. However,
the [AME] should form a general impression of the emotional
stability and mental state of the applicant.”41 The Guide further
notes the importance of protecting applicants from having to
disclose sensitive personal information to a governmental entity
without a significant relation to the interest of aviation safety.42
35 14 C.F.R. § 67.107.
36 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., Synopsis of Medical Standards, in FAA GUIDE FOR AVIA-
TION MEDICAL EXAMINERS 361 (2016).
37 Id. at 152.
38 Id. at 10, 13.
39 Id. at 155.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 152.
42 Id.
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The Guide further explains how the AME may be advised of po-
tential issues with mental health based on answers an applicant
provides to general questions about the applicant’s background,
occupation, reasons for seeking a medical certificate, and simple
conversational techniques of getting to know the applicant.43 If
the AME suspects any issues, the AME is instructed to either
deny or defer issuance of a medical certificate, noting the issues
on a specific line of the examination report.44 If the application
is deferred, the AME is instructed to report the significant find-
ings to the FAA.45 The FAA will then request further evaluation
and information from the applicant.46 For instance, the FAA
may require the applicant to submit a report from a mental
health specialist.47 Deferral of a medical certificate does not con-
stitute a denial that would prevent a pilot from using a valid
state driver’s license as a medical certificate for operation of a
light-sport aircraft pursuant to FAR 61.23(c).48
43 Id. at 152–53. The Guide notes, “The use of a psychotropic drug is disquali-
fying for aeromedical certification purposes.” Id. at 154. Drugs specifically noted
as disqualifying include, “all sedatives, tranquilizers, antipsychotic drugs, an-
tidepressant drugs [including SSRIs], analeptics, anxiolytics, and hallucinogens.”
Id.
44 Id. at 154.
45 Id.
46 The FAA requires complete cooperation of Airmen with regard to investiga-
tion of potential issues noted in the medical examination:
Medical records.
(a) Whenever the Administrator finds that additional medical in-
formation or history is necessary to determine whether you
meet the medical standards required to hold a medical certifi-
cate, you must:
(1) Furnish that information to the FAA; or
(2) Authorize any clinic, hospital, physician, or other person
to release to the FAA all available information or records
concerning that history.
(b) If you fail to provide the requested medical information or his-
tory or to authorize its release, the FAA may suspend, modify,
or revoke your medical certificate or, in the case of an appli-
cant, deny the application for a medical certificate.
(c) If your medical certificate is suspended, modified, or revoked
under paragraph (b) of this section, that suspension or modifi-
cation remains in effect until you provide the requested infor-
mation, history, or authorization to the FAA and until the FAA
determines that you meet the medical standards set forth in
this part.
Medical Standards and Certification, 14 C.F.R. § 67.413 (2016).
47 Id.
48 See Certification: Pilots, Flight Instructors, and Ground Instructors, 14 C.F.R.
§ 61.23(c)(2)(ii)–(iii) (2016).
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B. EMPLOYMENT CONCERNS
Airlines in the United States must operate within the FARs
while finding a balance with general laws protecting employees
from discrimination and laws protecting the privacy of employ-
ees’ medical conditions.49 Within the U.S. legal system, airlines
are targets for not only employment law disputes, but also tort
litigation initiated by passengers.50 Because airlines will ulti-
mately be held liable for any injuries to passengers caused by the
negligent or intentional acts of pilots and crew employed by the
airline,51 the airlines have a strong argument in favor of elevat-
ing safety concerns over employees’ privacy and discrimination
concerns.
1. Regulatory and Statutory Framework Governing Airlines’ Powers
to Implement Safety Standards and Include Personnel
Requirements
In general, airlines have a fair amount of latitude with regard
to formulation and enforcement of safety policies and proce-
dures, including assessment of their pilots’ fitness to fly.52 It is
accepted that airlines, not courts, possess requisite expertise to
determine how best to safely operate, and airlines operate at
great leeway and discretion in determining that manner.53 For
example, as federal law clearly places the responsibility upon an
airline to determine whether a pilot possesses the judgment to
serve as Pilot-in-Command, an arbitrator exceeded his responsi-
bility where he ordered retraining and requalification opportu-
nity for a pilot who had been demoted by his air carrier
employer for repeated errors of judgment.54 Importantly, the
FAA regulations set forth “minimum” standards that may be ex-
ceeded by airlines if they feel it necessary for safety purposes.55
Specifically, 49 U.S.C. § 44701(b)(1) provides that “[t]he Ad-
ministrator may prescribe minimum safety standards for . . . an
49 See generally 14 C.F.R. § 67; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2008).
50 See Wilbur J. Russ, Tort Liability of Air Carriers to their Passengers, 39 CALIF. L.
REV. 541 (1951).
51 See id.
52 See Johnson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 745 F.2d 988, 993 (5th Cir. 1984).
53 Id. (quoting Murnane v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(“[T]he airline industry must be accorded great leeway and discretion in deter-
mining the manner in which it may be operated most safely.”)).
54 World Airways, Inc. v Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 800, 800 (9th
Cir. 1978).
55 49 U.S.C. § 44701(b) (2016).
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air carrier to whom a certificate is issued under section 44705 of
this title.”56
However, absent preemption by FAA regulations, air carriers
are still largely bound by laws of general applicability. As such,
because emotional and mental conditions can, in some in-
stances, be considered a disability, an airline employer must also
consider the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)57 when dealing with personnel mental health issues. In
relevant part, the ADA provides that a covered employer shall
not discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual.58 “Discrimination”
under the ADA encompasses not only adverse employment ac-
tion with regard to hiring, advancement, training, compensa-
tion, discharge, or other terms and conditions of employment,
but also failure to make reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, un-
less the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business.59
In the first instance, it is important to note that courts recog-
nize a few circumstances in which employers need not engage in
any accommodation, such as threats of violence,60 or illegal con-
duct.61 As such, an airline may take action against a pilot,
whether disabled or not, who threatens violence, has committed
an illegal activity, or poses a “direct threat.”62 The focus of this
section is on more nebulous situations.
Under the evidentiary framework developed in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green63 for claims of discriminatory treatment in
employment, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. To make out a prima facie case under the ADA,
the plaintiff bears the burden of showing three things: (1) that
he has a disability; (2) that he is a qualified individual; and (3)
that he was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of his
56 Id.
57 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2008).
58 Id. § 12112(a).
59 Id. § 12112(b).
60 Palmer v. Circuit Court, 117 F.3d 351, 351 (7th Cir. 1997).
61 Harris v. Polk County, 103 F.3d 696, 696 (8th Cir. 1996).
62 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (2012).
63 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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disability.64 The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employment ac-
tion.65 If the employer meets this burden, then the presumption
of intentional discrimination disappears, but the plaintiff can
still prove disparate treatment by, for instance, offering evidence
demonstrating that the employer’s explanation is pretextual.66
Under the ADA, a person is considered disabled if he: (1)
suffers from “a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities”; (2) has “a record of
such impairment”; or (3) is “regarded as having such an impair-
ment.”67 The regulations promulgated under the ADA deal ex-
tensively with the meaning of disability. As to the concept of
substantial limitation, the regulations indicate that in deciding
whether a particular condition is substantially limiting, the court
should interpret the term broadly and in an individualized man-
ner.68 Additionally, the regulations note that with regard to
claims that a condition is a disability because it substantially lim-
its the life activity of working, the term “substantially limits”
means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as com-
pared to the average person having comparable training, skills,
and abilities.69 The inability to perform a single, particular job
does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life ac-
tivity of working.70
Finally, the regulations set out three factors which the court
may consider in looking at the question of whether a plaintiff is
substantially limited from working.71
In determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a
major life activity, it may be useful . . . to consider . . . the condi-
tion under which the individual performs the major life activity;
the manner in which the individual performs the major life activ-
ity; [and] the duration of time it takes the individual to perform
the major life activity, or for which the individual can perform
the major life activity.72
64 Id. at 802.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012).
68 Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Ameri-




72 Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii).
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The ADA sets forth a detailed framework that provides that an
employer may require a medical examination after an offer of
employment is made and condition the offer on the results of
the examination, which is of particular concern for pilots under-
going psychological testing.73 Thus, employers may require a
psychological examination and even withdraw an offer of em-
ployment so long as its decision is job-related and consistent
with a business necessity and no reasonable accommodation will
enable the employee to perform the essential functions of the
job.74 Indeed, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) specifically recognizes that:
[I]n many industries, such as air transportation . . . , applicants
for certain positions are chosen on the basis of many factors in-
cluding physical and psychological criteria, some of which may
be identified as a result of post-offer medical examinations given
prior to entry on duty. Only those employees who meet the em-
ployer ’s physical and psychological criteria for the job, with or
without reasonable accommodation, will be qualified to receive
confirmed offers of employment and begin working.75
2. Psychological Screening in Addition to Requirements of FAA
Certification
As a practical matter, many airlines do evaluate pilot candi-
dates based on examination over and above the FAA medical
certification.76 Case law and pilot forums providing insight into
employer hiring processes suggest that at least one major carrier
required a battery of standardized tests (to include the Minne-
sota Multiphasic Personality Test, the Shipley Institute for Living
Test, the Wesman verbal and math tests, and mechanical, spa-
tial, and abstract Differential Aptitude Tests) administered by
industrial psychologists.77 However, as full-scale psychometric
screening costs between $2,500 and $3,500 and requires six
hours per person,78 after a pilot begins flying, the airline is un-
likely to test again unless and until an issue manifests itself.
73 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (2008).
74 Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.14(b) (2016).
75 Id.
76 Puhy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1577, 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
77 Id.
78 Alison Griswold, Could Better Psychological Testing Prevent a Tragedy Like the
Germanwings Crash? Probably Not, SLATE (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.slate.com/
articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2015/03/germanw-
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3. Testing and Discipline Upon Discovery of Psychological Concern
The case of Witter v. Delta Airlines79 is illustrative of the issues
that a court may consider if a pilot is grounded for mental
health reasons and pursues an ADA claim. Plaintiff Witter, a
Delta pilot, was involved in a domestic dispute with his wife
wherein he threatened to commit suicide.80 As a result of this
incident, plaintiff was incarcerated, sent for psychiatric evalua-
tion, and then transferred to another hospital at Delta’s re-
quest.81 Afterward, “plaintiff voluntarily grounded himself
because he believed that he was not medically fit to fly.”82 He
also found an AME who diagnosed him with bipolar disorder
(the decision suggests, but does not make explicit, that the diag-
nosis may have been to help Witter so that his medical certifica-
tion would be denied, making him eligible for disability
benefits).83 Subsequently, Witter was seen by an FAA psychia-
trist, who determined that while he had a “‘characterological
problem that might be considered a personality disorder,’ he
should nonetheless be issued Class I Medical Certification” on
the condition that he submit semi-annual updated psychiatric
reports.84 Upon presentation of the certificate to Delta’s Chief
Pilot in Atlanta, Delta decided that the plaintiff should be fur-
ther evaluated by a senior AME who also was board certified in
aerospace medicine.85 This AME later submitted a report to
Delta concluding that the plaintiff suffered from an Adjustment
Disorder with Mixed Emotional Features but was qualified to
fly.86
Later that year, the plaintiff had a conflict with crew members
that resulted in the crew refusing to follow his instructions.87 He
was further evaluated, diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality
Disorder and possible Cyclothymia,88 and grounded as a result.89
The FAA convened a panel of six psychiatrists to review his
ings_crash_airlines_screen_pilots_for_physical_and_mental_health.html [https:/
/perma.cc/LTF4-T7BR].
79 966 F. Supp. 1193, 1198–99 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
80 Id. at 1195.
81 Id.
82 Id.





88 A condition similar to bipolar disorder but with less severe mood swings. See
Cyclothemia, MAYO CLINIC (June 4, 2015), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-
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case.90 The FAA panel found that plaintiff should not be certi-
fied, but the “NTSB overturned the FAA’s decision and restored
[p]laintiff’s Class I Medical Certification.”91 Delta, however, re-
fused to reinstate the plaintiff to flight status without further
medical evaluation.92
Plaintiff subsequently filed suit, alleging violations of the ADA
based upon the airline’s refusal to reinstate him to flight sta-
tus.93 Particularly, “Plaintiff claim[ed] that he [was] disabled for
purposes of the statute because he suffers from a mental impair-
ment that substantially limits his major life activity of working.”94
The court granted Delta’s motion for summary judgment,
holding that plaintiff did not establish that he was “disabled”
under the ADA.95 Applying the regulations discussed above, the
court found that “[p]laintiff [was] not substantially limited in
the life activity of working.”96 Of note, his “psychological condi-
tion [did] not appear to be exceptionally severe as it only ap-
pear[ed] to be a serious condition when plaintiff is under
stress.”97 Additionally, “the long-term impact of [p]laintiff’s psy-
chological condition [did] not appear great as the NTSB has
found that his Class I Medical Certification should be re-
turned.”98 Furthermore, plaintiff, a resident of the metropolitan
Atlanta area, lived in a community with substantial job
opportunities.99
Nor did his condition “disqualify him completely from the
class of jobs that utilize similar training, skills, knowledge, and
ability.”100 Although the plaintiff could not pilot an aircraft due
to the loss of his Class I Medical Certification, Delta employed
pilots in management, flight training, and administrative posi-
tions.101 Finally, while his condition may have made it impossible
conditions/cyclothymia/basics/definition/con-20028763 [https://perma.cc/GQ
5G-SL3Q].




93 Id. at 1195.
94 Id. at 1198.
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for him to fly a commercial aircraft, plaintiff did not even argue
that he was in any way impaired from holding any other job.102
While the court did not reach the other elements of his prima
facie case, much less undertake the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting analysis, it is unlikely that plaintiff could have estab-
lished that he was a qualified individual subjected to unlawful
discrimination because of his disability, as required to make his
prima facie ADA case.103 Specifically, the testing after the inci-
dents with his wife and co-workers is unlikely to be found an
adverse employment action as needed for a finding that an em-
ployee has been subjected to discrimination.104 This is because
after an employee has been hired and has begun working, the
ADA provides that an employer “shall not require a medical ex-
amination . . . unless such examination . . . is shown to be job-
related and consistent with business necessity.”105 The court
“may uphold an employer’s request for a medical examination
whenever the employer has an honest belief rooted in particu-
larized facts that an employee may not be able to perform the
essential functions of his job.”106
As the FAA has mandated that pilots must not have any
mental or personality disorder that would render them “unable
to safely perform the duties or exercise the privileges of the air-
man certificate applied for or held,” it is arguably obvious that
psychological testing for a pilot exhibiting behavior that made
the airline honestly believe that he or she may not be able to do
the job is both warranted and defensible against ADA claims.107
Although there are no reported decisions to this point, Sullivan
v. River Valley School District, a case involving the testing of a
school superintendent, who had verbal outbursts, shoved papers
into the faces of colleagues, and disclosed confidential student
information, held that there was not an adverse employment ac-
tion and that suspending the superintendent for refusing to
comply was not retaliatory.108
As for the “qualified individual” status of the plaintiff in Witter,
or another pilot like him who has been determined not to have
102 Id.
103 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
104 See id.
105 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2008).
106 Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 813 (6th Cir. 1999).
107 Id.; see Medical Standards and Certification, 14 C.F.R § 67.107(b)(3)(i)
(2016).
108 Sullivan, 197 F.3d at 814.
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an absolutely disqualifying condition but whom the airline be-
lieves should be grounded, an employee is not a qualified indi-
vidual under the ADA if he poses “a significant risk of
substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or
others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable ac-
commodation.”109 An employer need not make any accommoda-
tion that would constitute an undue hardship.110
Importantly, where the employee’s essential job functions
necessarily implicate the safety of others, an employee must
demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that
does not endanger others.111 In McKenzie v. Benton,112 the court
found that the employee, a sheriff’s deputy with post-traumatic
stress disorder and a history of self-inflicted wounds and shoot-
ing her father’s grave bore the burden of proving that she was
not a “direct threat” to others.113 The McKenzie court also noted
that the ADA provides that “the term ‘qualification standards’
may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace.”114 Accordingly, as a practical matter it may be diffi-
cult for a pilot diagnosed with a mental or emotional disorder to
demonstrate that he or she is “qualified.”
However, to balance safety concerns with risk management
from the ADA claim perspective, best practices in a gray area
may be to consider, if possible, an accommodation in the form
of allowance of time for medical care.115 The airline also may
wish to consider whether the pilot is suitable for a non-flying
position in training or management, although making a reason-
109 Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2016). In some cases, the em-
ployer bears the burden of making an assessment of risk based on medical or
other objective evidence and the determination that a significant risk exists must
be objectively reasonable. Id. To determine whether a risk is significant, the em-
ployer must consider: “(1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of
the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4)
the imminence of the potential harm.” Id. The direct threat defense must be
based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical
knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence, and upon an expressly
individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the
essential functions of the job. Id.
110 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
111 388 F.3d 1342, 1342 (10th Cir. 2004).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1355.
115 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012).
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able accommodation does not require that the employee be
promoted.116
C. EUROPE
Aviation safety within the European Union is overseen by
EASA, which, incidentally, is headquartered in Cologne, Ger-
many.117 Additionally, within Germany, the Luftfahrt-
Bundesamt (LBA) has been tasked with the goal of “avert[ing]
hazards to the safety of aviation as well as to public safety and
order” since 1954.118
1. Pre-Crash Regulations
European regulations regarding medical certification appear
to be less specific and perhaps more susceptible to differing in-
terpretations than the FARs, particularly with regard to estab-
lishing disqualifying conditions relative to mental health.119 It is
noteworthy that the first real substantive statement in the Euro-
pean Regulations, following the general definitions of terms,
mandates protection of the pilot’s medical confidentiality.120 Ad-
ditionally, the AME is instructed that he or she must advise the
pilot of the potential consequences of failing to report medical
issues truthfully.121
MED.A.025 Obligations of AeMC, AME, GMP and OHMP
(a) When conducting medical examinations and/or assess-
ments, AeMC, AME, GMP and OHMP shall:
(1) ensure that communication with the person can be es-
tablished without language barriers;
(2) make the person aware of the consequences of provid-
ing incomplete, inaccurate or false statements on their
medical history.
116 Id.
117 The Agency Facts and Figures, EASA, https://www.easa.europa.eu/the-agency
/the-agency [https://perma.cc/EX4X-9Q9Y].
118 The History of the Luftfahrt-Bundesamt (Federal Aviation Office), LBA (Feb. 10,
2011), http://www.lba.de/EN/LBA/History/History_node.html [https://perma
.cc/Q6LS-4EQM].
119 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., Psychiatric, in FAA GUIDE FOR AVIATION MEDICAL EX-
AMINERS 151 (2016).
120 Commission Regulation 1178/2011 of Nov. 3 2011, Laying Down Technical
Requirements and Administrative Procedures Related to Civil Aviation Aircrew
Pursuant to Regulation (EC) 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the
Council, annex IV, 2011 O.J. (L 311) 174 [hereinafter EASA Piloting Regula-
tions] (“All persons involved in medical examination, assessment and certifica-
tion shall ensure that medical confidentiality is respected at all times.”).
121 Id. at 175.
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(b) After completion of the aero-medical examinations and/or
assessment, the AeMC, AME, GMP and OHMP shall:
(1) advise the person whether fit, unfit or referred to the
licensing authority, AeMC or AME as applicable;
(2) inform the person of any limitation that may restrict
flight training or the privileges of the license, or cabin
crew attestation as applicable;
(3) if the person has been assessed as unfit, inform him/her
of his/her right of a secondary review; and
(4) in the case of applicants for a medical certificate, submit
without delay a signed, or electronically authenticated,
report to include the assessment result and a copy of the
medical certificate to the licensing authority.122
As stated previously, Lubitz was denied a medical certificate
twice during his training, in April and July of 2009 and, subse-
quently, when his certificate was issued only two weeks after the
second denial, it contained restrictions, as contemplated in the
above-quoted regulation.123 The investigation by BEA revealed
that the denials were related to his diagnosis and treatment for
depression.124 With regard to mental health, EASA Regulations
provide as follows:
MED.B.055 Psychiatry
(a) Applicants shall have no established medical history or
clinical diagnosis of any psychiatric disease or disability, con-
dition or disorder, acute or chronic, congenital or acquired,
which is likely to interfere with the safe exercise of the privi-
leges of the applicable licence(s).
(b) Applicants with a mental or behavi[o]ral disorder due to al-
cohol or other use or abuse of psychotropic substances shall
be assessed as unfit pending recovery and freedom from sub-
stance use and subject to satisfactory psychiatric evaluation
after successful treatment. Applicants for a Class 1 medical
certificate shall be referred to the licensing authority. Fitness
of Class 2 applicants shall be assessed in consultation with
the licensing authority.




(4) mental or behavi[o]ral disorder;
122 Id.
123 BEA PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
124 Id.
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shall undergo satisfactory psychiatric evaluation before a fit as-
sessment can be made.
(d) Applicants with a history of a single or repeated acts of delib-
erate self-harm shall be assessed as unfit. Applicants shall un-
dergo satisfactory psychiatric evaluation before a fit
assessment can be considered.
(e) Aero-medical assessment:
(1) applicants for a Class 1 medical certificate with one of
the conditions detailed in (b), (c) or (d) above shall be
referred to the licensing authority;
(2) fitness of Class 2 applicants with one of the conditions
detailed in (b), (c) or (d) above shall be assessed in con-
sultation with the licensing authority.
(f) Applicants with an established history or clinical diagnosis of
schizophrenia, schizotypal or delusional disorder shall be as-
sessed as unfit.125
MED.B.055 Psychology
(a) Applicants shall have no established psychological deficien-
cies, which are likely to interfere with the safe exercise of the
privileges of the applicable licen[s]e(s).
(b) A psychological evaluation may be required as part of, or
complementary to, a specialist psychiatric or neurological
examination.126
The disqualifying conditions under EASA’s regulations seem
to rely quite extensively on the forthrightness of the individual
pilot seeking a medical certificate. The standards appear to be
relatively subjective compared to those set forth in the FAA reg-
ulations discussed above.127 For example, the EASA regulations
do not address disqualification for chemical dependence.128
However, it should be noted that despite the greater specificity
set forth in the FAA regulations, it seems the FAA also issued a
first class medical certificate to Lubitz after initially denying his
application.129
125 EASA Piloting Regulations, supra note 120, at 185.
126 Id. at 186.
127 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., Psychiatric, supra note 119, at 151–52.
128 Id.
129 Victoria Bryan & David Morgan, Germanwings Pilot was Briefly Refused Medical
Certificate in U.S., REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
france-crash-faa-idUSKBN0NL24P20150430 [https://perma.cc/KP79-57Y3]; AIR-
MAN MEDXPRESS EXAM SUBMITTAL PROCESS FOR DIWS EXAM (MID) NUMBER:
200004752955 (2010) [hereinafter FAA AIRMAN MEDICAL FILE], http://www.faa
.gov/foia/electronic_reading_room/pilot_records/media/lubitz.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7HAE-XWH7]. Lubitz’s Airman Medical File includes the following
correspondence: (1) July 8, 2010, letter requesting Lubitz submit a report from
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2. Post-Crash Response
In its Preliminary Report of the Germanwings crash investiga-
tion, BEA noted that EASA issued a Safety Information Bulletin
(SIB n. 2015–14) just three days after the crash, recommending
that operators establish standards requiring no less than two
crew members remain in the cockpit at all times.130 On October
17, 2015, EASA published its “Action Plan for the Implementa-
tion of the Germanwings Task Force Recommendations.”131 In
that Action Plan, EASA noted the following recommendations
from its Germanwings Task Force:
1. Implementation of a “2-persons-in-the-cockpit” require-
ment.132
2. Psychological Evaluation of all airline pilots “as part of train-
ing or before entering service.”133 Within this recommenda-
tion, the task force further recommended that “[t]he
psychological part of the initial and recurrent aeromedical as-
sessment and the related training for aero-medical examiners
should be strengthened.”134
3. Mandated random drug and alcohol testing in the case of “ini-
tial Class 1 medical assessment or when employed by an air-
line, post-incident/accident, with due cause, and . . . after a
positive test result.”135
his physician with specific details regarding his history of reactive depression; (2)
July 10, 2009, letter from physician (translated from German to English on July
27, 2010), which notes the “severe depressive episode without psychotic symp-
toms [is] in complete remission.”; February 23, 2010, Certificate from his treating
psychotherapist, which states Lubitz “was under my psychotherapeutic treatment
from January to October 2009. Mr. Lubitz’s high motivation and active participa-
tion contributed to the successful completion of the treatment, after the manage-
ment of symptoms.” See FAA AIRMAN MEDICAL FILE, supra. On July 28, 2010, the
FAA issued Lubitz a third-class medical certificate, cautioning: “Because of your
history of reactive depression, operation of aircraft is prohibited at any time new
symptoms or adverse changes occur or any time medication and/or treatment is
required.” Id.
130 BEA PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 27.
131 EASA, ACTION PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GERMANWINGS TASK
FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, VERSION 1-7 OCTOBER 2015 1 (2015) [hereinafter AC-
TION PLAN].
132 Id. at 3. Note this Rule was established in the United States in FAA guide-
lines regarding Procedures for Opening, Closing, and Locking Flight Deck Doors
shortly after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 3-47 Procedures for
Opening, Closing, and Locking Flight Deck Doors, in 3 GENERAL TECHNICAL ADMINIS-
TRATION (2016).
133 ACTION PLAN, supra note 131, at 3.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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4. More oversight of aero[ ]medical examiners and fostering a
network of peer support.136
5. Creation of a “European aeromedical data repository as a first
step to facilitate the sharing of aeromedical information and
tackle the issue of pilot non-declaration.”137 EASA suggests
that this repository in addition to revised national regulations
will “ensure that an appropriate balance is found between pa-
tient confidentiality and the protection of public safety.”138
EASA further offers to “lead the project to deliver the neces-
sary software tool” for the repository.139
6. “[I]mplementation of pilot support and reporting systems,
linked to the employer Safety Management System within the
framework of a non-punitive work environment and without
compromising Just Culture principles.”140
The recommendations that have been set forth by the EASA
Task Force do not seem particularly likely to prevent another
incident like the Germanwings crash from occurring in the fu-
ture. While implementation of the 2-persons-in-the-cockpit rule
seems to be a logical step toward prevention, access to the cock-
pit did not prevent the 1999 EgyptAir crash referenced in the
BEA Preliminary Report.141 The remaining recommendations
would not have prevented the Germanwings crash either. Luf-
thansa and Germanwings were aware of Lubitz’s history of de-
pression and need to be monitored closely.142 However, it seems
they failed to ensure that Lubitz’s condition was closely moni-
tored, and they were likely prevented from communicating di-
rectly with Lubitz’s doctors by German and European privacy
laws.143 None of the recommended actions in the plan set forth
above deal with the problem of inaccessible medical informa-






141 See BEA PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 27.
142 See, e.g., Lufthansa Says It Was Not Obligated to Report Pilot’s Medical Records, AL
JAZEERA AM. (Apr. 6, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/4/6/
lufthansa-not-obligated-to-report-pilots-record.html [https://perma.cc/4L89-
QBCT].
143 See id. (“Privacy is fiercely guarded in Germany, a reaction to the mass sur-
veillance carried out by the Gestapo in the Nazi era and the Stasi in post-war
communist East Germany. Under German law, employers cannot access employ-
ees’ medical records and sick notes excusing a person from work do not specify
their medical condition.”).
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However, the stated importance of pilot privacy144 is not an over-
statement. Pilots are already subjected to more strict regulation
of their mental and physical health than probably any other pro-
fession.145 Failing to protect the privacy of pilots with regard to
their medical and psychiatric records may simply lead pilots ex-
periencing difficulties to refuse to report those difficulties even
to their health care providers.
III. PILOT’S BILL OF RIGHTS 2
On February 25, 2015, Senator Jim Inhofe and Representative
Sam Graves introduced a bill to amend the Pilot’s Bill of
Rights.146 The stated purpose of the Bill is to “facilitate appeals
and to apply to other certificates issued by the [FAA], [and] to
require the revision of the third[-]class medical certification reg-
ulations issued by the [FAA].”147 The first section of the Bill
would expand the types of flights and aircraft that could be op-
erated with just a valid State driver’s license without any FAA
medical certificate.148 Pursuant to the Bill, a pilot flying an air-
craft with fewer than five passengers, which has a maximum seat-
ing capacity of six occupants and maximum certificated takeoff
weight of no more than 6,000 pounds, can fly without a medical
certificate under visual flight rules (VFR) or instrument flight
rules (IFR) at a maximum altitude of 14,000 feet and maximum
indicated airspeed of 250 knots.149 The current regulations allow
for use of a valid driver’s license in lieu of a medical certificate
only for light-sport aircraft, gliders, or balloons.150 A light-sport
aircraft is defined as:
[A]n aircraft, other than a helicopter or powered-lift that, since
its original certification, has continued to meet the following:
(1) A maximum takeoff weight of not more than –
i. 1,320 pounds (600 kilograms) for aircraft not intended
for operation on water; or
ii. 1,430 pounds (650 kilograms) for an aircraft intended
for operation on water.
144 See ACTION PLAN, supra note 131, at 3.
145 See EASA Piloting Regulations, supra note 120.
146 S. 571, 114th Cong. (2015).
147 Id.
148 Id. § 2.
149 Id.
150 Certification: Pilots, Flight Instructors, and Ground Instructors, 14 C.F.R.
§ 61.23(c)(1) (2016).
374 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [81
(2) A maximum airspeed in level flight with maximum continu-
ous power (VH) of not more than 120 knots CAS under
standard atmospheric conditions at sea level.
(3) A maximum never-exceed speed (VNE) of not more than
120 knots CAS for a glider.
(4) A maximum stalling speed or minimum steady flight speed
without the use of lift-enhancing devices (VS1) of not more
than 45 knots CAS at the aircraft’s maximum certificated
takeoff weight and most critical center of gravity.
(5) A maximum seating capacity of no more than two persons,
including the pilot.
(6) A single, reciprocating engine, if powered.
(7) A fixed or ground-adjustable propeller if a powered aircraft
other than a powered glider.
(8) A fixed or feathering propeller system if a powered glider.
(9) A fixed-pitch, semi-rigid, teetering, two-blade rotor system,
if a gyroplane.
(10) A non[-]pressurized cabin, if equipped with a cabin.
(11) Fixed landing gear, except for an aircraft intended for op-
eration on water or a glider.
(12) Fixed or retractable landing gear, or a hull, for an aircraft
intended for operation on water.
(13) Fixed or retractable landing gear for a glider.151
The amendments proposed in the Pilot’s Bill of Rights 2 not
only simplify the standards for operating an aircraft with a
driver’s license as the pilot’s medical certificate, but also expand
the operations that can be carried out in this manner.152 The
maximum weight is increased from 1,320 or 1,430 pounds to
6,000 pounds; the maximum speed is increased from 120 knots
CAS to 250 knots indicated; and the maximum capacity is in-
creased from two occupants to six occupants.153 Along with the
expansion, the Bill would require the Administrator to report
within five years regarding changes in small aircraft activity and
safety-related incidents.154
The proposed amendment of the regulations allowing pilots
to fly a more diverse category of aircraft may prove beneficial to
encouraging self-regulation with regard to reduced medical fit-
ness. Although an airline pilot who is denied a first class medical
certificate will not be able to remain employed by the airline to
151 Id. § 61.23(c); Definitions and Abbreviations, 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2016) (defin-
ing “Light-sport aircraft”).
152 S. 571, 114th Cong. (2015).
153 Id. § 2(a)(8).
154 Id. § 2(h).
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pilot the same type aircraft, that same pilot may remain eligible
for a less than first-class medical certificate. Further, the knowl-
edge that some level of piloting will remain available without a
medical certificate might be sufficient consolation to reduce the
stress and anxiety pilots feel when noticing possible changes in
medical condition, such as Lubitz’s concern about his vision.155
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. airline industry has seen record low accident rates
over the past few years.156 However, high profile foreign acci-
dents in recent years, including the Germanwings crash, leave
the public with a feeling that aviation is becoming less safe in
some sense,157 leading to calls for more regulations. In the next
twenty years, it is anticipated that demand for airline pilots will
exceed supply.158 Now, possibly more than ever, it will be critical
to find the balance between enacting regulations that enhance
safety in commercial aviation and encouragement and promo-
tion of aviation activities, including the business level operation
of airlines as well as the more personal level of pilot training,
recruitment, and retention. For airlines, which have a tremen-
dous business interest in ensuring safety, even if only for liability
and goodwill concerns, the cost of extensive medical assessment
needs to be balanced with the actual risk posed by mental disor-
ders. For prospective and current pilots, the decision to seek
employment as an airline transport pilot may come down to a
balance between love of flying and concerns about privacy, ex-
pense, and hassle. The Wall Street Journal recently quoted Peggy
Gilligan of the FAA as stating, “ ‘Safety numbers are already so
low that you must count close calls, accidents that didn’t hap-
pen[,]’ to target safety enhancements.”159 EASA’s executive di-
rector, Patrick Ky, was quoted in the same article as saying, “One
Germanwings is one too many, for sure . . . . The challenge that
I put to our organization is to aim for zero accidents, which we
155 See Huggler, supra note 16.
156 Andy Pasztor, U.S. Airline Accident Rate Remained Near Record Low Last Year,




158 Brian Prentice & Philippe Gouel, Pilot Shortage Threatens to Slow U.S. Airline
Growth, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverwyman/
2016/01/28/pilot-shortage-threatens-to-slow-u-s-airline-growth/#75b1e60ebb6e
[perma.cc/Z4YD-STD2].
159 Pasztor, supra note 156.
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will never reach.”160 It seems public misconceptions regarding
safety will keep the regulators busy for the foreseeable future.
160 Id.
